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This brief summarizes the policy implications of 
three thematic papers and seven country 
background papers prepared for the COMESA-
ACTESA  policy seminar on “Variations in staple 
food prices: Causes, consequences, and policy 
implications.”  There is little controversy about the 
need for governments to support staple food 
markets with infrastructure, market information, 
agricultural research, and other public goods.  
However, many of the most costly agricultural 
programs in eastern and southern Africa involve 
raising food prices to protect farmers, lowering food 
prices to protect consumers, and reducing volatility 
in food prices through a variety of mechanisms 
including tariffs, export restrictions, public trading 
in staple foods, and subsidized distribution.   A 
review of the experience with these policies is 
particularly relevant in the wake of the global food 
crisis, which has led to an expansion in trade 
restrictions and stabilization efforts. 
What are the policies and investments that will 
reduce agricultural marketing margins between 
locations?  Based on a review of recent research on 
food markets in Africa, we offer the following 
recommendations:  
•  Continue the process of agricultural market 
liberalization.  Five of the seven recent studies 
found that agricultural market liberalization had 
reduced marketing margins and improved 
efficiency.  
•  Streamline administrative border procedures, 
which may be a greater obstacle to regional 
trade than poor roads.  One such step would be 
to explore the feasibility of regional uniform 
truck registration. 
•  Promote competition in the transport industries 
by reducing barriers to entry into the transport 
industry and eliminating protection for local 
trucking companies. 
•  Improve market information using information 
and communication technology. Strong 
evidence from Niger and other countries 
suggests that mobile phones can lower price 
spreads between markets and improve market 
efficiency.   
•  Improve transportation infrastructure. This 
becomes more important as administrative and 
policy barriers to trade are relaxed.  
These measures would reduce transport costs and 
trader profits, shrinking the gap between the price 
farmers receive for staple crops and the price 
consumers pay.   
How can African countries reduce vulnerability to 
fluctuations in world food prices?  The global food 
crisis in 2007-08 has sparked renewed interest in 
food self-sufficiency.  Self-sufficiency in maize is 
feasible in many  African countries that already 
produce 90-95% of their requirements.  For rice and 
wheat, however,  achieving  self-sufficiency  would 
be either a major challenge or almost impossible.   
One approach, which is politically appealing 
because of its quick results, is to restrict imports.  If 
enforceable, import restrictions can increase the rate 
of self-sufficiency quickly, but they raise the price 
of staple foods significantly. Avoiding vulnerability 
to a spike in world grain prices like the one in 2007-
08 could require keeping grain prices permanently 
at or above the peak levels during the crisis.  This 
would have serious adverse effects on food security, 
particularly among the urban poor.   
A better approach to pursuing self-sufficiency is to 
boost domestic production by investing in 
agricultural research, extension, disease control, and 
storage methods.  Based on numerous studies, this 
would be a good long-term investment regardless of 
its success in achieving self-sufficiency. However, 
staple food self-sufficiency would not eliminate 
food price volatility; rather it would replace 
volatility due to international markets with volatility 
due to domestic supply shocks.  The evidence 
suggests that price volatility due to domestic supply 
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shocks is at least as large as volatility due to 
international markets.  For example, import parity 
prices of maize are generally more stable than 
domestic maize prices in Africa.  Furthermore, the 
price of rice (a largely tradable grain) is less 
seasonal and more stable than the price of maize (a 
largely non-tradable grain) because regular imports 
stabilize the former.  
As  food-importers, sub-Saharan African countries 
have a strong interest in restraining major exporters 
from imposing export restrictions, which were 
responsible for exacerbating the price increases 
during the global food crisis. This could be done by 
lobbying the World Trade Organization to limit 
food export restrictions as part of multi-lateral trade 
agreements.   
Similarly, the effects of another spike in world food 
prices could be ameliorated if African countries 
themselves restrained from banning grain exports.  
Although these bans are understandable from the 
perspective of an individual country, the combined 
effect of many countries doing this is to exacerbate 
the price spike, particularly for landlocked 
countries. Efforts to limit food export bans would 
have to be carried out at the regional level rather 
than at the national level.   
In the longer term, African governments can 
promote resilience to volatility in international grain 
prices by diversifying the staple foods diet of 
consumers.  During the global food crisis, the 
domestic prices of cassava, sweet potatoes, and 
other non-tradable staple foods rose much less than 
the prices of rice, wheat, and maize.   
Do trade restrictions and government interventions 
to buy, sell, and trade staple food crops reduce price 
volatility?  A comparison of the experiences in 
eastern and southern Africa found that these policies 
have not helped Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, and 
Tanzania stabilize maize prices. After controlling 
for seasonal patterns and size of harvest, maize 
price volatility was lower in Uganda and 
Mozambique, where the government rarely restricts 
international grain trade and does not maintain 
buffer stocks. Thus, trade barriers and public grain 
reserves tend to worsen price instability.  
Trade restrictions widen the band between import 
and export parity prices within which domestic 
prices can fluctuate.  The experience of Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Kenya, and Madagascar  indicates that 
grain prices occasionally exceed the import parity 
price because of 1) the rationing  of foreign 
exchange to prevent depreciation of the currency, 2) 
the inability of traders to obtain food import 
permits, and 3) uncertainty regarding the 
government’s intentions regarding food imports.  
These spikes can be avoided by maintaining open 
borders and a realistic exchange rate. 
Grain reserves used for stabilization introduce 
uncertainty because purchase and sale operations 
are large and unpredictable. Traders are hesitant to 
compete against a subsidized public enterprise and 
may withdraw from seasonal storage and grain 
trading. Thus, public grain reserves tend to displace 
private traders, depriving the market of the 
stabilizing effect of their arbitrage activities.   
Policy and institutional changes can facilitate grain 
price stabilization by promoting regional trade with 
an open borders policy.  In addition, they can 
encourage  private storage by using public grain 
reserves for emergency relief only. If a more activist 
trade and grain reserve policy is deemed necessary, 
it should be made as predictable and rules-based as 
possible, with clear criteria for when tariff rates will 
be adjusted and when public grain stocks will be 
bought and sold.   
This does not mean that governments have no role 
to play in staple food markets. As mentioned above, 
they have an important role in addressing market 
imperfections and promoting equity.  For example, 
the government needs to play an active role in: 
•  providing public goods such as agricultural 
research and extension, agricultural statistics, 
crop forecasts, market information services, and 
transportation infrastructure;  
•  addressing externalities in agricultural markets 
by controlling plant and animal disease and 
regulating agricultural chemicals;  
•  promoting competition in agricultural trade and 
processing; and   
•  implementing emergency relief and other well-
targeted poverty-reduction programs.  
While some price variation in inevitable, the policies 
described here will contribute to a stable and predictable 
policy environment and competitive staple food 
markets, in which price margins between markets and 
volatility over time are minimized. 